A Quasi-Experimental Approach to the Effects of Unemployment Insurance by Bruce D. Meyer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
A QUASI -EXPERIMENTALAPPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Bruce 0. Meyer
Working Paper No. 3159




I would like to thanic David Card and Phil Levine for useful discussions1 and
Sandy Korenman, Alan Krueger, Walter Nicholson, Gary Solon, Paula Worthington
and seminar participants at the Universities Research Conference on Social
Insurance, the Sloan Conference on The Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market
Interventions, the NBER State and Local Public Finance meetings, and Princeton
for their comments. Patricia Anderson and Julie Ho provided outstanding
research assistance. This paper was written while the author was visiting the
Industrial Relations Section Princeton University. I thank the Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University and the National Science Foundation
through grant SES-8821721 for their financial support. This paper is part of
NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of
the author not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3159
November 1989
AQUASI -EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OFUNEMPLOYMENTiNSURANCE
ABS TMCI
Thispaper uses the natural experiment provided by periodicincreases Ln
statebenefit levels to estimate the effects of higher unemployment insurance
benefits, Individuals who filed just before and just after sixteen benefit
increases are compared using data from five states during 1979-1984. The
increases, which average about 9 percent, are found to increase the period of
unemployment insurance receipt by about one week. This effect is precisely
estimated and found using several approaches. the incidence of layoffs
resulting in unemployment insurance claims is unaffected by the increases.
The evidence does not suggest that higher benefits lead to better jobs. In
fact, the post-unemployment earnings of individuals receiving higher benefits





Evanston, IL 60208I. Introduction
There are many unresolved issues about the effects of unemployment
insurance (UI). Many studies have examined the effects of the level of UI
benefits on the length of unemployment spells. However, Welch (1977) and
others have criticized these studies, arguing that it is difficult to
distinguish effects of UI from effects of previous earnings since the level of
benefits is a nonlinear function of previous earnings. In this paper, the
natural experiment provided by periodic increases in state benefit levels is
used to obtain estimates of the effects of higher UI benefits. While higher
UI benefits may increase the length of unemployment spells, they may also lead
to higher reemployment earnings. This hypothesis has not been extensively
tested.I compare both the spell lengths and reemployment earnings of people
beginning UI spells just before and after benefit increases.
There are numerous papers on the effects of UI on the length of
unemployment spells. Excellent surveys can be found in Danziger. Haveman and
Plotnick (1981), Gustman (1983), Hamermesh (1977), and Welch (1977). Welch
(1977) criticizes the conventional methodology by pointing out that within a
given state at a point in time, the weekly Ut benefit is a constant fraction
of previous earnings except when an individual receives the minimum or maximum
weekly benefitJ Thus, in a regression of spell length on weekly benefits and
previous earnings, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of UI
and possible nonlinear effects of previous earnings.
'The benefit structure of state workers' compensation programs also has
this form. Ehrenberg (1988) makes the same criticism of studies of the
effects of workers' compensation benefits on the time until return to work.2
This paper uses only the variation in UI benefit levels that comes from
periodic increases in the maximum weekly benefit amount to estimate the
effects of the level of UI benefits on the length of unemployment and
reemployment earnings. This new methodology allows one to examine the effect
of exogenous variation in benefits on unemployment duration and incidence. In
the typical study of spell lengths, the variation in UI benefits comes from
some combination of different replacement rates in different states different
minima and maxima, and maybe some variation in these parameters over time.
This paper uses one component of this variation which can be separated out and
used to identify the effects of UI.
The spirit of the approach taken here is similar to that of Classen
(1979) and Solon (1985). Classen uses data from Arizona and Pennsylvania
around the time of two benefit increases. In a regression analysis, she
allows a kink at the earnings necessary for the maximum benefit in an
otherwise linear relationship between previous earnings and spell length.
Solon examines the length of UI receipt in Georgia just before and after the
introduction of federal income taxation of UI for high income individuals in
1979. He compares the spell lengths of individuals with high income last year
who are likely to pay taxes on their UI benefits, to individuals with low
income last year who are unlikely to pay taxes. The present study has the
advantage that the assignment of an individual to the high or low benefit
group is precise, and does not rely on the imputation of tax rates.
Additionally, sixteen events which change the level of benefits are examined,
rather than one or two.
Some early work by Ehrenberg and Caxaca (1976) and others examined the
effects of UI on reemployment earnings, but this topic has not been pursued3
much recently. Many theoretical search models such as Mortensen (1970)
predict that higher UI benefits will be associated with longer unemployment
spells, and a higher wage conditional on finding a job. This paper tests
these hypotheses using a source of variation in UI benefits that is unrelated
to the individual's earnings history.
This paper is novel in its disaggregation of the effects of UI by recall
status, expectations about recall, and UI payroll tax status. Various authors
have emphasized the importance of these variables in determining the effects
of UI. Feldstein (1975, 1978) emphasizes the quantitative importance of
temporary layoffs. He concludes that among "unemployed job losers" temporary
layoffs account for about half of the spells. He further argues that
conventional models of search unemployment are inappropriate for this group.
In his empirical work using the Current Population Survey (CPS) he finds that
higher UI benefits are associated with much higher levels of temporary layoff
unemployment.
Topel (1983, 1984) also uses the CPS and distinguishes between temporary
and permanent layoffs, and the incidence and duration of unemployment. Also,
for state/industry cells he imputes the average UI subsidy due to incomplete
experience rating. Re finds that this subsidy greatly increases temporary
layoff unemployment and slightly increases permanent layoff unemployment.
Incidence of unemployment is found to be particularly affected by incomplete
experience rating.
Corson and Nicholson (1983) find that about two-thirds of UI recipients
in a small two-state sample return to their previous employer. Using the same
data, Katz and Meyer (1988) find the two alternatives of being recalled or
taking a new job have very different time patterns and are affected in very4
different ways by UI and other variables. The present study provides separate
results for those that expect to be recalled and those who do not.
It is important to know whether higher benefits affect spell lengths
primarily through individual search as opposed to firm layoff and recall
policies. Brechling (1981) and Topel (1983, 1984) have empirically examined
the effect of incomplete experience rating on unemployment using state level
measures of experience rating. Surprisingly, no one has looked at firm level
tax rates even though the incentive effects of incomplete experience rating
depend on where a firm lies on a nonlinear and nonmono tonic marginal tax
schedule, This paper examines the effect of firm level tax rates on layoff
and recall patterns.
2. Data
The source of data for this study is a large sample of UI claimants taken
from the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) project. Individuals are
randomly selected for the sample using the last two digits of their Social
Security number. Data on 392,000 unemployment spells2 in eight states3 from
January 1979 to early 1984 are available. The data include accurate
administrative records on the key UI parameters: the weekly benefit amount,
2The unit of observation is really a benefityear. The benefit year is a
year long period starting when an individual files for UI benefits. Some
information on the length of spells within the benefit year is available, but
the best information is on cumulative benefits received during the benefit
year.
3nte eight states are Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington. GWEN data were collected for
several other states, but these states have intermittent data, cover a shorter
time period, or have other drawbacks.S
the potential duration of benefits, and weeks of benefits received. Some
demographic information including age, sex, race and education is in most
cases administratively collected, along with additional survey information on
expectations about recall to a previous employer, marital status, dependents,
occupation, family earnings, and other variables. These individual data are
matched to administrative data for each of an individual's covered employers
during a 21 quarter period. These additional data allow the calculation of
previous and subsequent earnings, and an indicator for whether or not an
individual is recalled by a previous employer. The employer data also
include UI payroll tax rates, 4-digit SIC codes, and the number of employees
each quarter.
3. Methods
The main idea for the experimental design for this study can be seen in
Figure 1. Figure 1 displays a typical state schedule relating the weekly UI
benefit amount to previous earnings.The solid line is the schedule prior to
a change in the state law which raises the minimum and maximum weekly benefit
amount (WBA). The dashed line is the schedule after the benefit increase.
Between the minimum and the maximum, the weekly benefit amount is a constant
fraction of earnings during the highest calendar quarter of the base period
(the first four of the last five calendar quarters prior to the date of filing
for UI).
For people with high quarter earnings of at least E4 (the H group), I
compare the mean weeks of UI received and reemployment earnings of people who
filed for UI benefits just prior to and just after the change in the benefit6
schedule.4 Those who file before the increase receive B°max while those
filing afterwards receive Bnmax. An individual's filing date determines his
UI benefit amount for his entire benefit year (the one year period following
date of claim). Thus, two individuals with high quarter earnings greater than
E4 will receive different weekly benefits for their entire benefit year if one
filed a few days before and the other a few days after the effective date of
the benefit increase. This is the main idea of the paper. Most of the
remaining methodological problems involve correcting for possible differences
between the individuals filing just before and just after the benefit
increase. In much of what follows, I will use as a comparison group those
with earnings between E2 and E3 (the L group) who file just before and just
after the benefit increase. The benefits these individuals receive are
unaffected by the increase in the maximum benefit amount.
The analysis uses sixteen benefit increases which are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 summarizes some key characteristics of the state UI laws.5 I exclude
increases which straddle any of the following changes: the partial taxation of
benefits in January 1979 and January 1982, changes in the replacement rate (on
the linear part of the benefit schedule), and changes in the potential
duration of benefits, I also use only benefit increases far enough from the
beginning and end of the sampling frame that a complete benefit year of data
is available for each person. Lastly, I exclude South Carolina because the
'In principle, one could also examine the effects of increases in the
minimum weekly benefit amount. Unfortunately, few people receive the minimum
benefit and it is raised infrequently.
5The information needed for this table was obtained from the Department
of Labor publications Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, and
Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, and numerous
conversations with officials of state employment security agencies.7
benefit increases are very small (they total $7 over three years). An
extremely large benefit increase itt Georgia is excluded because it is three
times as large as the others. Results for this increase are discussed in
Section 6.
The sixteen benefit increases are fairly evenly spread across three times
of the year: January, July and September. The increases are automatic annual
increases because the maximum benefit is indexed to state average weekly
earnings in the five states examined. This research is aided by the high
rate of nominal wage growth during the late seventies and the early eighties,
which leads to large benefit increases averaging between 9 and 10 percent.
also present results for sixteen "placebo periods" below. These are periods
aroundthe same dayand year as actual benefit increases but the data come
from states where the UI law did not change. These periods serve as an
additionalcomparison group for the results found using the benefit increases.
A list of the placebo periods is provided in Table 2. The selection criteria
for placebo periods was similar to that for benefit increases in that the
periods could not overlap any other change in the UI law. In 13 of 16 cases
this reduced the set to a single state. In the other 3 cases I picked a state
that had not been already used for many placebo periods.
To make the before group (B group) and after group (A grâup) as
comparable as possible, the upper and lower limits (E2 and E3) on previous
earnings for the L group, and the lower earnings limit (E4) for the H group,
were indexed using state level average weekly earnings in UI covered
employment.6 The period before and after each benefit increase that was used
6These data are unpublished, but were provided on a quarterly basis by
Cindy Ambler of the Department of Labor.8
for the analysis is diagrammed in Figure 2. The B group is the two month long
period ending one-half month before the benefit increase, and the A group is
the two month period beginning one-half month after the increase. The one
month period surrounding the increase was not analyzed in case there was
strategic behavior by claimants who waited until after the increase to file
for benefits in order to receive a higher weekly payment.7 The sample only
includes males, since in most cases there are less than 20 women in the high
earnings groups. In all, I use 18,370 observations around benefit increases,
and 24,642 around placebo periods. A breakdown of these totals by subgroups
is given in the notes to Table 4.
Figure 3 shows the timing of the earnings periods that are used to
measure the effects of UI on post-unemployment earnings. Two earnings
periods are examined. The first period is the 4 quarters beginning with the
quarter of claim (this is approximately the benefit year). The second period
is the 4 quarters after the first period, so it is approximately the year
after the benefit year. Notice that the mean claim date (assuming a uniform
distribution) for the B group is exactly one quarter before the mean claim
date for the A group. This sample design was used to keep the earnings
measures comparable for the A and B groups.
7Results excluding a two month period around the benefit increases are
reported in Table 13. They do not differ appreciably from the results with
the one month exclusion, except for the expected larger standard errors.9
4. Results for Weeks of UI Received and Change in Reemployment Earnings
Table 4 reports summary measures of the effects of each of the sixteen
increases in state maximum benefits on spell length, earnings, and the





-LBL) ,whereLj1 is the mean weeks of UI
received for the AN group. The AH group is just the intersection of the A
group and the H group, i.e. those claimants with high quarter earnings above
those needed for the new maximum benefit amount who filed between one-half
month and two and one-half months after the benefit Increase. LSH1 LAL.
and LBL. are defined analogously. The statistic AL. is the change in mean
spell length for those subject to the change in the maximum benefit compared
to the change over the same period for those unaffected by the increase.
Subtracting out the change for those unaffected by the increase should
eliminate the potential bias caused by changes in durations (and variabl.es
affecting them) over the three month period between the claim dates of those
in the B group and those in the A group. Results with and without this
adjustment are generally reported below. Table 4 and the following results
also exclude individuals that were rehired as part of a recall that was a
large fraction of the state's data because these observation cannot be treated
as independent. If a recall accounts for more than 3 percent of the
observations, it is dropped from the sample.8
The earnings measures used are the natural log of mean earnings. Let
E1AN. be the log of the average value of earnings during the benefit year for
8Results including these observations are reported in Table 13 for comparison.10
the Mi group. Define Elan. ElAL and 1sL analogously for the 3M, AL and BL
groups respectively. Then AEI. — - EIBH.-
(E1ALJ,
-E1BL.)is the
measure of change in earnings during the benefit year associated with the
increase in UI benefits, The measure of change in earnings during the year
after the benefit year, AE2., is defined analogously.
The measure of incidence of UI claims for increase i is ANL —NMiu/NBH.
-
NALi/NELi
.Thisstatistic measures the change in incidence of claims for
high earnings individuals compared to low earnings Individuals. The separate
halves of AN., NMIL/NBH and NALi/NBLi are also generally reported.
The change in weeks of UI benefits1 reemployment earnings and incidence
of UI claims can be seen for each of the 16 increases in Table 4. The weeks
of benefits measure is the number of weeks of full Iii benefits9 received
during the benefit year. There is evidence that higher benefits tend to
increase the number of weeks of benefits received, Of the 16 increases, 12
show longer unemployment spells. there is no clear pattern to the change in
relative incidence of UI claims. There is some pattern of a. decline in
earnings during the year following the benefit year.
Table 5reportsthe results of optimally combining the numbers from the
16 increase of Table 4 into a single number. The statistics from each benefit
increase are summed, weighting by the variance of the statistic. For example,
the mean change in weeks of benefits received, AL is calculated as
9Weeks of full benefits do not include partial UI. Partial benefits are
paid when an individual does some work for pay after being laid off from his
primary job. Tabulations from the CWBH data indicate that about one-third of
UI claimants receive some weeks of partial Cit benefits. Most of these people
receive partial UI for only a few weeks.U
(Xl/var(AL)Y1 ot1/var(aL). This formula is just the weighted least
squares regression of ALi on a constant, with the weights equal to l/var(aLi).
var(tsl.1) —var(LJiJii)+ var(LzH) + var(LALi) + var(LBL1) •wherevar(LMi)
and the other terms are calculated using the usual formula for the variance of
a sample mean. The earnings and incidence statistics are averaged in the same
mariner.10
Table 5 reports several estimates of duration, earnings and incidence in
addition to those in Table 4. Means and standard deviations for the duration
as well as other key sample variables are reported in Table 3. The duration
measure. "Weeks of Full Benefits, Only Positive Weeks" excludes those claims
that do not result in any benefits being paid. In the CWBH data about 18
percent of claims do not result in the payment of benefits. Roughly half of
these claims without benefits are individuals who are disqualified, while the
other half are people who find a job before the waiting week expires.11 The
Last duration measure is weeks of regular UI benefits. -Thismeasure excludes
federal and state extended benefits and federal supplemental benefits and is
calculated using dollars paid so that it accounts for partial UI. Weeks of
regular benefits provide a check against the other results. The changes in
lOi have also tried weighted least squares (WLS) regressions using the 16
observations on the change in weeks of benefits or earnings regressed on the
corresponding percentage increase in the maximum benefit amount. I do not put
much weight on these \JLS results since they are riot very robust and depend on
the treatment of the constant. An example is provided by the weeks of full
benefits results. If a constant is included, the coefficient (standard error)
for the constant and the percentage increase are -1.505 (1.621) and .294
(.179) respectively. If a constant isnot included the, coefficient (standard
error) for the percentage Increase is .133 (.040).
This statement is based on the average initial claim disqualification
rate which is 8.5 percent in 1982 as reported in unpublished Unemployment
Insurance Service data, and the fraction of spells lasting one week which is
9.4 percent in the CWBH data.12
regular benefits are expected to be smaller than the other estimates because
they are more likely to be censored at exhaustion of benefits. The additionaL
earning measure is for the period of the benefit year as indicated in Figure
3. The second incidence measure excludes claims that do not result in any
benefits being paid.
Table 5 indicates large and significant increases in all measures of the
number of weeks of UI received for the average of the sixteen benefit
increases. Weeks of full benefits in the benefit year, with or without those
with zero weeks, are estimated to rise over one week. Using the means from
Table 3, the implied elasticities of weeks of full benefits, including and
excluding those with zero weeks, are .698 and .549 respectively. If one
takes the average percentage increase in the maximum to be 7.28 (the 9.32
average nominal percentage increase minus the 2.04 average percentage increase
in wages) the elasticities are a bit larger, .894 and .703 respectively. In
comparison, the average of each duration measure for the placebo periods is
small, negative and insignificant. Thus large increases in duration occur
after benefit increases, while no significant change is seen for placebo
periods.
Table 5 also decomposes the benefit increase and placebo period
statistics into changes for the high and low earnings groups separately. The
decomposition shows that most of the changes in duration for the benefit
increases are due to large increases in spell length for those with high
earnings. Those with low earnings experience a small and in most cases
insignificant increase in duration. These last results suggest that the true
effects of higher benefits are being measured. The results are also
consistent with the change in duration for the low earnings group being an13
unnecessary control, so that the results for the change in duration for those
withhighearnings could be used directly.
For the benefit increases, earnings show an appreciable decline during
the benefit year. The decline is consistent with more weeks of UI receipt and
fewer weeks of work during the benefit year. There is an estimated decline
also during the year after the benefit year, but the estimated decline is
smaller than that found for the placebo periods. There is essentially no
change in the relative incidence of layoffs of high earnings individuals
after the benefit increases and the placebo periods. The change in the number
of claims is very close to zero and insignificant.
Separate results for those expecting recall and those not expecting
recall are reported in Table 7. The exact question is "do you expect to be
called back to work by any of your past employers?" The question is part of
the CWBH questionnaire which is administered when an individual files for UI.
This is the ex ante concept of temporary layoffs discussed in Katz and Meyer
(1988). This measure should be preferred to the CI'S ateasure since it is asked
at the start of spell for all individuals. The CPS question asks people with
in-progress spells of varying length if they are "on layoff awaiting recall by
their employers." The CPS recall expectation concept is likely correlated
with unexpected changes in spell length if recall expectations change in the
course of spells)'2 As indicated in Table 6, about half of the individuals
in the benefit increase and placebo period sample expect to be recalled.
Large increases in duration are found for both those who expect recall
and those who do not. Comparisons of the two groups are difficult however
1'2See Katz (1985) for a model where a person updates his recall
expectations as a spell continues.14
because of the larger standard errors and because the sign of the difference
in the point estimates depend on the statistic examined. If one compares the
high-low results, then those who expect recall have bigger responses. the
reverse is true if one compares the high statistics. The high-low placebos
for those expecting recall are surprisingly large and negative. In general,
the disaggregated results seem much more variable and are hard to compare
because their standard errors are larger.
Similar results are found when the sample is divided by actual recall
status rather than expectations. An individual is classified as recalled if
his employer during any of the three quarters after his last UI payment
matches his employer during either of the two quarters prior to claim. The
frequency of recall for each of the 7 states is reported in Table 6.
The last division of the sample is by the marginal tax cost of layoffs.
It is difficult to find variation in experience rating across firms that is
exogenous to the process of layoffs and recall rates since a firm's tax rate
is a function of previous layoff and recall rates. A possible solution is to
interact tax status with an exogenous change in benefits, such as an increase
in the maximum benefit amount. One can then examine whether tax status
affects the response of different firms. This strategy is taken here.
In four of the five benefit increase states13, I determine the firm which
laid off each individual, and then match that firm's UI payroll tax rate for
the year to that individual's spell. Given the firm's tax rate, I can
determine the firm's location on the state's tax schedule. I then treat the
13The tax cost of unemployment has not been calculated for Pennsylvania
since the combination of Benefit Ratio and Reserve Ratio experience rating
that is used there is much more difficult to summarize.15
schedule as being locally linear and determine how the firm's tax rate would
change in response to a small increase in unemployment by its former
employees.14 Then, following the approach of Topel (1983), I calculate the
present value of future taxes that the firm would pay if it slightly increased
the number or duration of its layoffs. The derivation of the formula for the
marginal tax cost of layoffs is reported in Appendix A. The calculations
modify Topel's formula for reserve ratio states to account for differing state
growth rates in the taxable wage base. The tax cost is the fraction of a
dollar that the firm would pay in future taxes if one dollar were paid to
former employees by the UI system.
I have divided the sample into UI recipients from low (< .5) and high (>
.5) tax cost firms and calculated the average change in duration and earnings
for each group. The results can be seen in Table 8. Most theories would
suggest a larger increase in duration or incidence of layoffs for low tax cost
firms, since they are paying a smaller fraction of the UI costs of the layoff.
Surprisingly, the point estimates suggest a greater change in weeks of UI
received for those with a high tax cost of unemployment,t5 Most of the
differences between high and low tax cost firms are statistically
insignificant though. The incidence number for the placebo periods are also
4The determination of states' tax schedules was done mostly by
contacting the individual states. Some information was obtained from the
Department of Labor's Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws and
Commerce Clearing House's Unemployment Insurance Reports. Government
entities, reimbursable employers, and employers that are charged the standard
rate are excluded from the sample. Changes in tax rates cannot be determined
for standard rated firms, since the changes depend on the firms' age and
reserve ratio which are unavailable.
15This is true for the entire sample as reported in Table 8, and when
Idaho and Louisiana are examined separately. These two states have a fairly
even split between UI recipients from high and low tax cost firms.16
puzzling as there are large changes in incidence in opposite directions for
the high and Low tax cost firms.
5. Regression Estimates
Regression estimates of duration and earnings effects that control for
differences across individuals are reported in Tables 9 through 12. The
estimates confirm the average change results reported earlier in Table S.
tables 9 and 10 report equations for the log of weeks of full benefits
received. The Table 9 sample includes both high and low earnings individuals,
while Table 10 includes only high previous earnings individuals, since the
results of Table S suggest that the low earnings individuals are an
unnecessary control that adds imprecision to the estimates.
In Table 9, the estimate of the effect of the benefit increases is the
coefficient on "After Increase, High Earnings Group (AM Group)". The AM Group
dummy variable equals one if an observation is in both the A and H groups. A
set of dummy variables has been included in the specifications in Table 9 50
that the AM group coefficient has an interpretation similar to the average
change estimates in table 5. All specifications include IS dummy variables
for benefit increases, 16 dummy variables for increases interacted with being
in the high earnings group, and 16 dummy variables for increases interacted
with being in the group after the benefit increase. In Table 10, the estimate
of the effect of the benefit increases is the coefficient on "After Increase,"
and I have included in the specifications 15 dummy variables for benefit
increases -17
In both Table 9 and 10, I progressively add more explanatory variables to
check if the AR group coefficient is biased by omitted differences between the
individuals who file before and after the benefit increases. The controls are
fairly extensive; they include race dummy variables, 5 age dummy variables, 6
education dummy variables, 45 industry dummy variables, 4 firm size variables,
and additional variables described in Appendix B. The sample sizes decrease
as additional variables are added because more observations are excluded due
to missing values.
The benefit increase coefficients in Table 9 are large and statistically
significant with a value of .07 to .08 through specification (4). This
specification already Includes controls for previous earnings, the duration of
benefits, age, race, education, firm size and 2-digit industry. In
specifications (5) and (6) the coefficients are smaller and less precisely
measured as one-half to two-thirds of the observations are excluded due to
missing variables. In Table 10 the benefit increase coefficients tend to be
somewhat more stable, ranging from about .06 to .09 in the six specifications.
The benefit increase coefficients from the Table 9 and 10 regressions
imply somewhat larger elasticities than implied by the differences in means of
Table 5. SInce the dependent variable is in logs, the coefficients are
directly interpretable as implying a 7 to 8 percent increase in duration after
the benefit increases. Since the increases average 9.32 percent, the implied
elasticity is approximately .8, or about 1.0 if one adjusts for the three
months of inflation between the before and after groups.
Tables 11 and 12 are analogous to Tables 9 and 10, but the regressions
estimate the change in earnings In response to the benefit increases. The
dependent variable is (earnings during the 4 quarters after the benefit year -18
base period earnings)/base period earnings. The earnings coefficients in
Table 11 have relatively large standard errors and are not very stable; the
last two specifications have coefficients of the opposite sign from the rest.
Those in Table 12 imply a decline in earnings in response to the benefit
increases and three of the coefficients are significantly different from zero
at the .05 level.. These coefficients provide some evidence for, an earnings
decline after the benefit increases.
6. Robustness Checks and the July 1981 Georgia Increase
Several alternative samples to the one analyzed in Table S are tried as
a check on the robustness of the earlier results. Table 13 reports four
alternative samples which (1) exclude the month before and after the increases
(2) include the Georgia July 1, 1981 increase as a 17th increase (3) include
large reeinployers, and (4) cover the entire year before and after the Georgia
1981 increase. The first alternative sample which excludes those filing one
month before and one month after the benefit increases gives estimates which
differ little from those in Table 5 except for slightly larger duration
effects and larger standard errors. The sample which includes the Georgia
1981 increase along with the others gives duration estimates which are sixty
to seventy percent as large as the ones from the 16 increases. This
difference results from a large estimated decline in duration after the
Georgia increase)6 The sample which includes large reemployers gives
estimates which are thirty to fifty percent larger for duration effects than
L6The point estimate (standard error) for the change in weeks of benefits
for the Georgia increase is -1.991 (.996).19
those in Table 5 and which suggest a slight decline in the incidence of
layoffs and a slightly greater decline in earnings than indicated in Table 5.
The last subsample, the year before and after the Georgia July 1, 1981
27.8 percent increase in the maximum benefit amount, was analyzed extensively.
I. compared the people who filed in a given calendar quarter to people who
filed in that same calendar quarter one year later. I excluded the one-half
month period just before and after the increase, and the corresponding
calendar periods one year earlier or later. These four groups were then
averaged in exactly the same way as the 16 increases were above.
The results reported in the last two columns of Table 13 indicate that
there are severe problems with using the Georgia increase to determine the
effects of higher benefltsDuring the year following the increase, layoffs
resulting in lit receipt rose dramatically, with the increase unevenly split
between high and low earnings individuals. While the 16 increases of Table 5
show changes in the two relative incidence measures of -.009and .000
respectively, the Georgia increase shows changes of -649and -.609.These
large declines in the relative incidence of high earnings individuals result
from enormous increases in incidence for low earnings individuals combined
with moderate increases for high earnings individuals.
Furthermore, the implied duration elasticities for Georgia depend greatly
on whether the High-Low estimates or the High estimates are used. Since the
mean duration of UI receipt in Georgia is about half that for the 16
increases, the elasticities are larger than one might expect from Table
17The mean duration of UI receipt for the Before Highgroup in Georgia
with and without individuals with zero weeks is 9.91 .and 11.74 respectively,
compared to 16.79 and 20.07 respectively for the average of the 16 increases.2Ô
For the High-Low statistics, the elasticities for the two duration measures
(with and without zeros) are .241 and .086 respectively. For the High
statistics the corresponding elasticities are .518 and .371 respectively.
Adjusting for the 10.2 percent increase in average wages over the year, the
elasticities are .818 and .585 respectively. These last elasticities are
similar to those found for the 16 increases above, while the High-Low
elasticities are considerable lower than the above elasticities.18
Regression equations analogous to those in Table 9 were estimated for the
Georgia sample. The coefficient estimates, which depend quite dramatically on
whether explanatory variables are included, evidence large changes in the
composition of unemployment during this period. In the specification
analogous to (4) in Table 9 the coefficient (standard error) on the "AB
groupTM dummy variable is .090 (.056). When specification (1) is tried with
this same sample the coefficient (standard error) is .014 (.054). In the
specification analogous to (5) in Table 9 the coefficient (standard error) on
the TMAH groupTM dummy variable is .105 (.056). When specification (I) is
estimated with the same sample the coefficient (standard error) is -.019
(.056). Specification (6) cannot be estimated since occupation is not known
for Georgia UI claimants. The specification (4) and (5) coefficients imply
benefit elasticities in the .3 to .6 range, with estimates at the higher end
if one adjusts for inflation.
A final check on the estimates of Table 5 was performed using information
on weeks worked in each calendar quarter which is available for individuals
18This analysis of the July 1, 1981 Georgia increase ignores the effects
of taxation of unemployment benefits which was extended to middle income
households and individuals on January 1, 1982.21
from Pennsylvania and Washington for 5 benefit increases. While the estimates
are only suggestive because of large standard errors, the increase in weeks of
UI seems to be associated with a roughly comparable decline in weeks worked.
The estimate (standard error) for the change in weeks of UI is 1.13 (.76) and
change in weeks worked is -.96 (.72)
7. Conclusions and Extensions
The estimates of duration effects found in this paper are somewhat larger
than most previous estimates. The elasticity of weeks of UI benefits with
respect to the weekly benefit amount is estimated to be about .8 to 1.0.
Previous elasticity estimates have clustered in the .2 to .5 range (see
Hamermesh (1977) or Dan.ziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981)). However, the
estimates are comparable to those found by Classen (1979) and are only
slightly larger than those found in Meyer (l988a). Glassen found an
elasticity of .6 in linear equations and about 1.0 in logarithms. When she
tried modifications of the OLS results such as splines or Tobits to account
for censoring, her estimates always rose.
One might argue that the duration results given here apply to weeks of
benefits and may say little about the number of weeks without work. One line
of argument is that higher UI benefits induce people to claim earlier. This
has been examined by Katz and Meyer (1988) and Solon (1981), who find no
support for this hypothesis. A second hypothesis is that filing for UI may
increase. There is no evidence in the incidence measures that the number of
initial claims increases. One could argue that people file for additional
weeks at the end of spells, but do not work less. The evidence on weeks22
worked from Pennsylvania and Washington given above is not consistent with
this last argument.
The estimates show some evidence of a decline in reemployment earnings
following the increases in benefits. Because the confidence intervals around
many of these estimates are large, the evidence in less conclusive about
effects on earnings. The estimates are, however, consistent with findings in
other studies which examine earnings responses. A decline in earnings in
response to higher UI benefits was generally found by Classen, but the
evidence was not strong. The UI experiments in Illinois and New Jersey which
offered payments to people who found a job quickly seemed to reduce the length
of UI receipt, but they also resulted in no change in earnings or a slight
increase in reemployment earningsJ9
There are several unsatisfactory aspects of this paper which suggest that
the approach should be taken as a complement, rather than a substitute for
more conventional regression approaches, Large standard errors prevent the
comparison of UI responses for different groups. The reemployment earnings
results are somewhat inconclusive. Lastly, the incidence results are puzzling
and suggest that a more direct approach like the examination of firm histories
of layoffs and recalls stay be useful. Other alternative ways of estimating UI
effects are estimation using flexible function of previous earnings and weekly
benefits, and comparisons of states with the same replacement rate but
differentmaximum benefit amounts.
19See Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) and Meyer (1988b) for the Illinois
experiments, and Corson et al (1989) for the New Jersey results.23
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Before and After Groups
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Benefit Year (BY) 4 Quarters After BYTable 1
Benefit Amounts and Qualifying Earnings Before




















7/1/79 116 121 4.3 --- 3016 3146
7/1/80 121 132 9.1 36 3146 3432 91001a
7/1/81 132 145 9.8 - -- 3432 3770
7/1/82 145 159 9.7 -- - 3770 4056
Louisiana
9/1/79 141 1.49 5.7 •-- 3525 3725
9/1/80 149 164 10,1 -- - 3725 4100
9/1/81 164 183 11.6 --- 4100 4575
9/1/82 183 205 12.0 - -- 4575 5125
New Mexico
1/4/81 106 117 10.4 24 2756 3042 624a
1/2/83 130 142 9.2 29 3380 3692 754aTable 1 (continued)
Benefit Amounts and Qualifying Earnings Before




















1/6/80 lS2' 162b 6.6 --- 3763 4013
1/4/81 162 175 8.0 35b 4013 4338 800
1/2/83 190 205 7.9 --. 4713 5088
Washington
7/6/80 137 iSO 9.5 41 3425° 3750° IO2S
7/5/81 150 163 8.7 45 3750 4075 1125
7/4/82 163 178 9.2 49 4075 4450 1225
Note: The WBA is the weekly benefit amount and HQE is high quarter earnings.
aQualifying Base Period Earnings were also increased in Idaho to $910.01
and in New Mexico to $780.00 in 1981 and $921.15 in 1983.
bme WBAs for Pennsylvania do not include dependents' allowances.
cAll qualifying high quarter earnings in Washington are actually the average of
earnings in the o highest quarters.Table 2
Placebo Periods
State and
Placebo State Date of Increase
Idaho 7/1/80 Missouri






Louisiana 9/1/82 New Mexico
New Mexico 1/4/81 Idaho




Washington 7/6/80 none available
Washington 7/5/81 Pennsylvania
Washington 7/4/82 Pennsylvania
Notes: Roth Georgia and Washington are used for
7/1/82 to keep the times of year of the increases
and piacebos as close as possible since no
placebo was available for the 7/6/80 increase in
Washington.Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables,






Weeks of Full Benefits 16.79 16.08 4901
Weeks of Full Benefits, 20.07 15.59 4102
Only Positive Weeks
Weeks of Regular Benefits 16.53 10.15 4171
Percent Increase in Maximum 9.32 1.74 4901
Percent Change in Earnings 2.04 .56 4901
in State During Period
Potential Duration of 27.67 3.61 4900
Regular Benefits (weeks)
Weekly Benefit Amount ($) 155.32 23.35 4901
Base Period Earnings ($) 19766.62 7679.14 4879
High Quarter Earnings ($) 6612.26 2613.23 4879
Age 36.78 12.10 4816
Years of Education 11.99 2.28 4499
1 if White .87 4787
1 if Expect Recall .58 2959
1 if Have Definite Recall Date .16 2806
1 if Married .74 3498
1 if Industry Construction .31 4901
1 if Industry Metals or .19 4901
Equipment
1 if Industry Other .15 4901
ManufacturingTable 4























































































































































































Notes: (1)Theninbers in parentheses are standard errors. (2) Earnings during the4quarters
after the benefit year are not available for benefit increases close to the end of the sample
period.(3) If one nmis the number of observations from each of the benefit increases or
placebo periods one obtains:
Group Benefit IncreasesPlacebo Periods
After Increase, High Earnings 4510 7936
After Increase, Law Earnings 4345 5061
Before Increase, High Earnings 4901 7242
Before Increase, Low Earnings 4614 4403
Total 18370 24642Table S
Average Change in Duration, Earnings and Incidence Measures
BenefitIncreases PlaceboPeriods
High-LowHigh Low High-Low High Low
Statistics of Form
After -Before

































































































Notes: (1) The nuabers in parentheses are standard errors. (2) The nuithers in this
table are averages of the nuthers in Table 4, where the individual, benefit increase
statistics are averaged weighting by the inverse of the variance of the individual
statistics. (3) The average of the High-Low statistics will not ingeneral equal
the average High minis the average Low since the weights for the two series differ.Table 6
Percentage Expecting Recall, Percentage Recalled, and Tax Cost for













































Notes: (1) The numbers in parentheses are ranks. (2) All numbers are
calculated using the sample from periods around benefit increases and
placebo periods. In each column, missing values are excluded from the -
calculations.i.e. those whose recall expectations are unknown are dropped
from the sample when calculating the percentage expecting recall.
(3) Since the sample exludes those who were part of a large recall, the
recall and expect recall fractions are below those from the full sample.Table 7
AwrageCian In [kiration, Earn1zgs ard Irtiderce Measures
withSeparate Results for tttse t FpectRecall,
ardttxzse wit D Not E<pect Recall

















































































tbtes: (1) See tS retes to Tthle 5. (2) Recall expectathxs cn fran ttE ncr to the
questiai "tt) 3W øpect to ba called back to crk by wty of yor past ezplcqers?".Table S
Aera than In Dratiat Earnings ad Irciderre Measires










. Rit-T.a H1Hi-La HiRi-IxM H1Hi-tø H1
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?btes: (1)See Us rates to Table 5.(2) Appexthc A describes Ut ccxkstncticn ofthe tax
cost neasire. (3)fls low taxcostsarpla irch ebservaticts fran IdaFo. Lazisiaia ad
Washington,fora total of 10berefit ircreases ad 5 placeboperiods. The higj tax cost sarple
Irclixiesdeservatiors fran Georgia, Idato, Lajisias, ad New tiexico, foratotal of9berefit
lzcreasesad 9placeboperiods.Table 9
Regression Equations for Log of Weeks of Full Benefits Received
Variable
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
—
(6)
After Increase, Rigi .0647






















































yes yes yes yes
2-digit Industry and Firm
Size Included
yes yes yes






Sample Size 16,049 13,955 l3955 12,504 1,109 5,659
R-squared .0398 .0511 .0601 .0822 .1589 .1809
Notes: (I) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weeks of full benefits
received, iitting observations with zero weeks. (2) Standard errors are in
parentheses.(3) All equations include dznny variables for each increase, the
increase dinnies interacted with being in the high earnings group (H group), and the
increase dumies interacted with being in the group after the benefit increase (A
group). (4) The cccplete list of explanatory variables is given in Appendix B.Table 10
Regression Equations for Log of Weeks of Rill Benefits Received,













































yes yes yes yes yes
Indicators for Extended
Benefitsarid FSG
yes yes yes yes
2-digit Industry and Firm'
Size Included
yes yes yes






Sample Size 8,609 7,632 7,632 7,042 4,567 3,343
R-squared .0322 .0423 .0510 .0892 .1726 .2045
Totes: (I) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weeks of full benefits
received, ccitting observations with zero weeks.(2) Standard errors are in
parentheses. (3) All equations include cknny variables for each increase.(4) The
complete list of explanatory variables is given in Appendix B.Table 11





















































Age, Sex, Race and
Education Included
yes yes yes yes
Indicators for Extended
Benefits and FSG
yes yes yes yes
2-digit Industry and Firm
Size Included
yes yes yes






Sample Size 11,243 9,616 7,963 5,390 3,431
R-squared .0432 .1163 .1273 .1477 .1595
Notes:(1) The dependent variable is the increase in earnings during the
4 quarters after the benefit year when compared to earnings during the base
period, i.e. (Earnings 4 Quarters -EarningsBase Period)/(Earnings Base
Period). (2) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. (3) All
equations include dummy variables for each increase, the increase dummies
interacted with being in the high earnings group (14 group), and the
increase dummies interacted with being in the group after the benefit
increase (A group).(4) The sample sizes are smaller than those in the
weeks of benefits equations because earnings are not available for benefit
increases near the end of the sample period. (5) The complete list of
explanatory variables is given in Appendix B.Table 12
Regression Equations for Earnings During Four Quarters




(2) (3) (4) (5)
After Increase, High
-.0256



































Age, Sex, Race and
Education Included






2-digit Industry and Firm
Size Included
yes yes yes






Sample Size 5)440 4,742 4,137 2,847 1,925
R'squared .0365 .0839 .1118 .1408 .1535
Notes: (I) The dependent variable is the increase in earnings during the
4 quartets after the benefit year when compared to earnings during the base
period, i.e. (Earnings 4 Quarters -EarningsBase Period)/(Earnings Base
Period). (2) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. (3) All
equations include dummy variables for each increase. (4) The sample sizes
are smaller than those in the weeks of benefits equations because earnings
are not available for benefit increases near the end of the sample period.
(5) The complete list of explanatory variables is given in Appendix B.Table 13
















tti-hM HiHi-ta lii&Hi-1n HiHii4a, Hii
Statistics of Fonn
After -Before




































































!ttes: See tM fls th TthIS 5.Appendix A: Reserve Ratio Experience Rating
This appendix derives a formula for the amount paid by a firm in future
benefits if one dollar is paid to the firm's recent former employees by the
UI system. The formula applies to reserve ratio experience rating systems
which are is use in most states. The derivation below extends the work of
Srechling (l977a, l977b) and Topel (1983). The notation follows that of
Topel.
Some useful definitions are:
—fractionof employees receiving UI on average during year t,
—UIbenefits on an annual basis in year t, i.e. is the average
weekly benefit amount times 52,
—reservescredited to employer's acount in year t,
—taxablewage base per employee in year t,
Nt —numberof employees in year t,
aUItax rate in year t,
8a geometricgrowth rate of firm's employment, i.e. N+1a8N
1ageometricgrowth rate of the nominal taxable wage base, i.e.
i —nominalinterest rate, and
r reserve ratio in year t.
The reserve ratio is the ratio of reserves to taxable payroll averaged over
the last three years,
(1) r— ________ t
2
(E )/3
for 8andi close to I. The change in reserves is the difference between
taxes paid and benefits paid to former employees
(2) R —R1+ rWN -PtZtNt




tLet the tax schedule be approximated by the linear relationship
(4) — - , or
(5) r — -
11
Substituting (5) in (3) yields
(6) o -Tt+l
- +9-yr- 9-yp/'W ,or
'1
(7)r1'o -n0'($ifl+(l/(9)-9-yi1)r + 91pB/'J
If one multiplies (7) by the wage base and employment one obtains the total
tax bill for year t+l
(8) N1W1i"1'o°
- ÷(1 - + 9272n1N/iB
-
Now,if increases by 1 dollar1 the present value of the implied
increase in future taxes is
22 22 22. 22 22 2
9''l' 9771(19'ii)






The extent to which (9) is less than one is a measure of the degree of
subsidy to layoffs or prolonged unemployment spells.Appendix B: Explanatory Variables Used in Regressions
Base Period Earnings are earnings during the first four of the five calendar
quarters prior to the claim date for UI.
High Quarter Earnings are earnings during the quarter of highest earnings in
the base period.
The Weekly Benefit Amount is the weekly UI benefit received, which includes
dependents' allowances in Pennsylvania.
The Potential Duration of Regular Benefits is the number of weeks of state
regular benefits to which an individual was entitled during his benefit year.
Age: dummy variables for age 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 or older.
Race: dummy variables for black, and other races.
Education: dummy variables for years of education equal to 8, 9-11, 12, 13-
15, 16, and 17 or more.
The indicators for extended benefits (ER) and Federal Supplemental
Compensation (PSC) take the value 1 if any time during the individuals
benefit year ER or FSC respectively is available, and 0 otherwise.
Industry: 45 dummy variables that are mostly 2-digit Standard Industrial
Classification industries, with some grouping of small industries together.
Firm Size: dummy variables for average number of employees between 20 and 99,
100-499, 500-1999, and 2000 or more.
Recall expectations: dummy variables for whether or not the individual
expects to be called back to any former employer, and whether or not he has a
definite recall date.
Occupation: 41 dummy variables for occupations that are mostly 2-digit
occupations from the Dictionary of Occupation Titles, with some grouping of
small occupations together.
Marriage: dummy variables for currently married, and never married.
Dependents: number of dependents.